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Abstract: In the case of A, B & C v Ireland the European Court of Human Rights found that 
there had been an interference with the applicants’ right to private life. However, “owing to 
the acute sensitivity of the moral and ethical issues raised by abortion” Ireland was afforded a 
wide margin of appreciation and was not found to have breached the Convention. This paper 
argues that the Court’s application of the margin of appreciation doctrine was 
disproportionate. Firstly, the existence of ‘consensus’ throughout Europe on permitting 
abortions where a woman’s health and wellbeing are at risk should have contracted the power 
of discretion afforded to national authorities. Secondly, the blanket deference is problematic 
as a matter of equality. The sensitivity of the abortion question is not a sufficient justification 
for judicial restraint. In light of the discriminatory nature of the policies in dispute, as well as 
the presence of an established principle that operates to narrow state discretion (consensus), 
European supervision should not have been restrained. Rather, it should have been 
heightened. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Ireland, abortion is almost completely illegal. Constitutional protection for unborn life 
limits the availability of abortion to circumstances where there is a direct threat to the life of a 
pregnant woman.1 The termination of pregnancy in any other circumstance is a criminal 
offence,2 and thus most women who seek a safe and legal abortion must leave the country. In 
2005, three Irish women who had previously travelled to the UK for abortions challenged 
these restrictions before the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter “the Court”), 
asserting that Ireland had breached Articles 2, 3, 8 and 14 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (hereafter “the Convention”) on the right to life, the right to be free from 
inhuman treatment, the right to privacy and the right to non-discrimination respectively. Their 
application was heard before the Grand Chamber of 17 judges on December 9, 2009.  The 
third applicant, C, was successful in her claim that her rights under article 8 of the 
Convention, including her right to physical integrity, were violated by the lack of an 
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1 Article 40.3.3, Bunreacht na hÉireann (Constitution of Ireland) as interpreted in Attorney General v X [1992] 
IESC 1, [1992] 1 IR 1 (Supreme Court of Ireland, 5 March 1992), The Protection of Life during Pregnancy Act 
2013 (2013 Act). 
2 ibid. Prior to the 2013 Act, the Offences against the Person Act 1861, ss 58-59 stated that the penalty for 
procuring an abortion was life servitude. 
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accessible procedure through which she could have established her qualification for a lawful 
abortion. 3 This ruling led to the adoption of the “The Protection of Life during Pregnancy 
Act 2013” – the first piece of legislation in Ireland to define the circumstances and processes 
within which abortion can be legally performed. While this certainly represents a welcome 
step forward for those seeking to liberalise abortion laws in Ireland, the situation for most 
women who seek access to abortions has in no way changed.  
 This includes applicants A and B, whose right to an abortion when their health and 
wellbeing are at risk was denied by the European Court. Though the Court found that there 
had been an interference with the applicants’ right to private life, “owing to the acute 
sensitivity of the moral and ethical issues raised by abortion”4 Ireland was afforded a wide 
margin of appreciation and was not found to have breached the Convention. This paper takes 
the position that such judicial deference is an unsound response to the violation of women’s 
reproductive freedom and a particularly problematic answer to emerge from an international 
human rights court. In the context of abortion rights, the practice of international and regional 
human rights bodies is central to protection and indeed to reform. As the case of C 
illuminates, where the applicant had to turn to the Court to find a means of accessing her pre-
existing rights under domestic law, women and advocates rely on the international framework 
as the last available forum to circumvent resistant governments and political inertia in their 
home states. Yet, the case of ABC is indicative of how far the Court is willing to go in this 
regard. The majority decision to dismiss the claims of A and B rests decidedly with a wide 
application of the margin of appreciation, and this paper will conclusively demonstrate that 
this application of the margin was disproportionate. 
 The critique is based on two distinct points. Firstly, the Court’s application of the 
margin of appreciation in ABC is flawed as a matter of legal method. In its attempt to 
disengage itself from the abortion question, the Court disregards well-established 
methodology of Strasbourg jurisprudence that should have served to strengthen the Court’s 
power of review. In particular, the existence of ‘consensus’ throughout Europe on permitting 
abortions where a woman’s health and wellbeing are at risk, should have contracted the 
power of discretion afforded to national authorities. Secondly, the blanket deference in ABC 
is problematic as a matter of equality. The regulation of abortion results in a gendered 
hierarchy of state protection for human rights, and legal policies that prescribe unequal 
treatment demand strict scrutiny. This is particularly true in the ECtHR context, as the Court 
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has in the past proclaimed gender equality as one of the key underlying principles of the 
Convention system.5 It will be argued that wide-ranging deference on policies that raise 
questions of equality cannot be reconciled with this goal. 
 Part B of this paper will provide an overview of the judicial approach in ABC and will 
offer a background on the operation of the margin of appreciation doctrine in ECHR 
jurisprudence. Part C consists of the first critique as to why the margin of appreciation in 
ABC is disproportionate. It illustrates that in affording Ireland a wide margin of appreciation, 
the Court disregards the long established Strasbourg methodology of ‘consensus.’ It makes 
clear that the novelty of the Court’s approach is indicative of a judicial desire to defer to the 
national position on abortion. In Part D, the paper demonstrates the implications of abortion 
policy on gender equality. It then analyses how the Court’s application of the margin of 
appreciation in ABC reproduces this inequality by devaluing women’s rights, dismissing the 
gendered impact of abortion policies and by endorsing a discriminatory policy of requiring 
women to go abroad to access human rights. In Part E, it concludes that the Court’s approach 
in ABC amounts to a reduction of its own institutional competence, as well as its mandate to 
uphold equality and to protect the rights of women. 
 
B. BACKGROUND 
The three applicants in ABC complained to the European Court that the restrictions on the 
availability of abortion in Ireland forced them to leave the country to access their 
reproductive freedom – a process which was expensive, dangerous, and traumatic. The first 
applicant, A, was a recovering alcoholic with four children in the care of the state. At risk of 
post-natal depression (which she had suffered after each of her four prior pregnancies) and of 
the view that a fifth child may impede her progress in becoming sober and reuniting with her 
family, she travelled to the UK in secret to obtain an abortion. The second applicant, B, was 
young, poor and felt that she could not care for a child on her own. She also travelled to the 
UK in secret. The third applicant, C, who was in remission from cancer, struggled to obtain 
information from medical practitioners as to the impact of her pregnancy on her health and 
life. Having researched the risks herself, she decided to travel to the UK for an abortion. 
Upon return to Ireland, she suffered prolonged bleeding and infection as consequences of an 
incomplete abortion, but experienced difficulty in accessing satisfactory medical care. The 
                                                 
5 For explicit reference see, among other authorities, Sahin . Turkey, App no 44774/98 (ECtHR, 10 November 
2005), para 115; Dahlab v Switzerland, App no 42393/98 (ECtHR, 15 February 2001); Abdulaziz v UK, App 
nos 9214/80 9473/81 9474/81 (ECtHR, 28 May 1985), para 78; Petrovic v Austria, App no 20458/92, 
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applicants argued that Irish abortion law subjected them to degrading treatment and risked 
their health. The third applicant also contended that her life had been placed at risk. 
Specifically, the applicants submitted that Ireland’s abortion prohibition violated their human 
rights under Articles 2 (Right to Life), 3 (Prohibition of Inhuman and Degrading Treatment), 
8 (Right to Respect for Family and Private Life) and 14 (Prohibition of Discrimination) of the 
European Convention. 
 In its 2010 judgement, the Grand Chamber determined that there was no violation of 
Article 2, as there existed no legal impediment to the applicants’ travelling abroad for an 
abortion. Although the third applicant had suffered post-abortion complications, the Court 
felt that there was no evidence of any relevant risk to her life.6 Regarding Article 3, the Court 
took the view that travelling abroad for an abortion was both psychologically and physically 
arduous for each of the applicants, and financially burdensome for the first applicant. 7 
However, in the Court’s opinion, this did not reach the minimum level of severity required to 
fall within the scope of Article 3.8  
 The heart of the Grand Chamber’s judgment addressed the violations of privacy and 
family life under Article 8. The Court found in favour of the third applicant,9 reiterating its 
previous position that, where abortion is legally permitted, the state has a positive obligation 
to ensure that it is accessible.10 The Court was adamant that Article 8 could not be interpreted 
as conferring a right to an abortion,11 but with respect to applicants A and B it accepted that 
the Irish prohibition on abortion for reasons of maternal welfare came within the scope of the 
applicants’ right to respect for their private lives under Article 8(1).12 However, it was judged 
that the prohibition amounted to an interference with that right, which was in accordance with 
the law, and pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of morals. Here the Court accepted 
the normative premise of abortion restrictions in Ireland as being “the profound moral views” 
of the Irish people, which demanded strong protection for pre-natal life.13 Yet, as required by 
Article 8(2), the proportionality of this interference had to be reviewed. To assess whether the 
prohibition on abortion was necessary in a democratic society, the Court considered whether 
Irish law 
                                                 
6 ABC (n 3), paras 158 - 159. 
7 ibid, para 163. 
8 ibid, para 165. 
9 ibid, para 163. 
10 See Tysiac v Poland, App no 5410/03 (ECtHR 20 March 2007). 
11 ABC (n 3), para 214. 
12 ibid, paras 214, 216. 
13 ibid, para 227. 
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“struck a fair balance between, on the one hand, the first and second applicants’ right 
to respect for their private lives under Article 8 and, on the other, the profound moral 
values of the Irish people as to the nature of life, and consequently as to the need to 
protect the life of the unborn.”14 
Significantly, in determining whether this balance was met, the Court afforded the Irish 
government a wide margin of appreciation. The Court reasoned that the Irish government’s 
“direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their country” enabled them to 
ascertain the content and requirements of national morals and the necessity of the 
restrictions.15 The claims of applicants A and B were dismissed. It was observed that the 
prohibition on abortion for the protection of a woman’s health and wellbeing came within 
Ireland’s margin of appreciation and, accordingly, Ireland’s abortion restrictions did not 
violate the Convention. 
 Given that the decision not to recognise the claims of applicants A and B centres upon 
the majority’s use of the margin of appreciation, it is useful at this point to consider the 
origins and operation of the doctrine under the Convention system. Defined as the line at 
which “international supervision should give way to a State Party’s discretion in enacting or 
enforcing its laws”,16 the margin of appreciation operates to reduce the level of scrutiny the 
Court applies to laws that interfere with an individual’s rights. This typically occurs when the 
Court is dealing with matters “of general policy, on which opinions within a democratic 
society may reasonably differ”.17 In such circumstances, the role of the domestic policy-
maker is given weight and, accordingly, the Member State may be considered “better suited 
to settle the dispute”.18 
 The doctrine was initially developed to address fear amongst Member States that 
European human rights policies could weaken national security.19 The Court awarded states a 
measure of discretion in assessing the proportionality of Article 15 emergency measures, and 
their compatibility with the Convention. 20  This deferential approach gradually evolved 
                                                 
14 ibid, para 230. 
15 ibid, para 232. 
16 Howard Charles Yorrow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights 
Jurisprudence (Martinus Nijhoff, 1996), 13. 
17 Greens and MT v United Kingdom, Appl nos 60041/08 and 60054/08 (ECtHR 23 November 2010), para 113. 
18 Dean Spielmann, ‘Allowing the Right Margin the European Court of Human Rights and the National Margin 
of Appreciation Doctrine: Waiver or Subsidiarity of European Review?’ (2012) CELS Working Papers Series, 
1. See also ABC (n 3), paras 232, 237. 
19 Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards’ (1999) 31 NYU Journal of 
International Law 843, 846. 
20 See Greece v United Kingdom, 1958-1959, YB Eur Conv On HR 174; Lawless v Ireland (No 3), App no 
332/57 (ECtHR 1 July 1961). 
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beyond security considerations and was applied to deal with issues such as language policies 
in education, 21  the allocation of natural resources, 22  and the imposition of free speech 
limitations to protect public morals.23 Benvenisti notes that this extension reflected a new 
philosophy within the Court: a philosophy grounded in notions of subsidiarity and 
democracy.24 That is, the Court recognised that primary responsibility for protecting human 
rights lies with Member States and that, in order for them to guarantee such protection, 
national authorities must consider local needs and conditions. 
 In modern jurisprudence the doctrine receives its greatest expression in determining 
the scope of the “personal freedoms”25 of the Convention (Articles 8-11), whereby states are 
expressly allowed to limit rights if “necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others.”26 The Court has recognised that there exists a great diversity of 
values throughout the Member States of the Council of Europe, and that this pluralism must 
be respected.27 By deferring to the national authorities, the margin is seen as embracing 
cultural diversity and incorporating societal differences into the Convention scheme of 
rights.28 Thus, where a case raises sensitive or moral issues, the Court is more likely to afford 
a wide margin of appreciation and find that there has been no breach of the Convention. As 
emphasised in X, Y and Z v the United Kingdom, this approach will be taken where there is no 
consensus among the Member States of the Council of Europe, “either as to the relative 
importance of the interest at stake or as to the best means of protecting it.”29 
 The extent to which the margin of appreciation reduces the intensity of the European 
Court’s review of rights violations can lead to concern. Letsas argues that the margin of 
appreciation can be deployed by the Court to avoid substantive human rights review 
                                                 
21 Belgian Linguistic Case, Application nos 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62 (ECtHR 23 July 1968) 307. 
22 James v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123, 46. 
23 Handyside v United Kingdom (1979–80) 1 EHRR 737. 
24 Benvenisti (n 19), 846. 
25 Yorrow (n 16) 25.  
26 See European Convention of Human Rights, Articles 8-11. 
27 See Paul Mahoney, ‘Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism?’ (1998) 19 HUM 
RTS LJ 1, 2, 4. 
28  Aron Ostrobvsky, ‘What’s So Funny About Peace, Love, and Understanding? How the Margins of 
Appreciation Doctrine Preserves Core Human Rights within Cultural Diversity and Legitimises International 
Human Rights Tribunals’ (2005) 1 Hanse Law Review 10. See also James Sweeney, ‘Divergence and Diversity 
in Post-Communist European Human Rights Cases’ (2005) Connecticut JIL 21. 
29 X, Y and Z v the United Kingdom, App no 21830/93 (ECtHR 22 April 1997) 44. See also Frette v France, 
App no. 36515/97 (ECtHR 26 February 2002) 41. 
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altogether.30 Where the Court waives its power of review completely, it is no longer just a 
margin that is afforded to public authorities, but substantive interpretive control.31 The danger 
here is that, if applied in this way, the margin of appreciation can relegate rights adjudication 
to domestic relativism. Immune from external review, states can become free to adopt 
policies that may prescribe a lower level of human rights protection than the Convention 
would otherwise impose. 
 This danger is realised in ABC. The margin of appreciation is invoked under the guise 
of protecting moral diversity on the sensitive question of abortion. Yet despite being 
championed as a means of ensuring respect for ethical diversity, the margin in ABC operates 
as a strategy of evasion for the majority. Though the Court found that there had been a 
violation of the applicants’ right to a private life, it proceeded to afford a wide margin of 
appreciation to Ireland, practically deferring to Ireland’s position. Significantly, this approach 
is disproportionate on the basis of the Court’s own principles regarding the margin of 
appreciation. Furthermore, it is unsound as a response from the European Court to the 
violation of reproductive freedom – an issue that is inextricably linked to gender equality. 
These arguments will be presented in turn. 
 
C. THE DISPROPORTIONATE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN ABC 
The Court’s application of the margin of appreciation was disproportionate on two main 
grounds. Firstly, the width of the margin should have been contracted in accordance with the 
long-standing methodology of European consensus. Additionally, the impetus behind the 
Court’s dubious legal reasoning is to avoid losing recourse to the margin of appreciation and 
to maintain its deferential approach on the subject of abortion. Secondly, blanket deference to 
the status quo is unjustified in abortion cases as, in this case, state regulation on abortion 
perpetuates inequality. Furthermore, though the Grand Chamber rigorously attempts to 
disengage itself from the conflict, its strategy of restraint serves to reinforce a gendered 
system of inequality. 
 
1. A Departure from Long Standing Methodology of the European Court 
The Court deemed that a measure of deference was appropriate in ABC, owing to “the acute 
sensitivity of the moral issues raised by the question of abortion.”32 The Court conceded 
                                                 
30 George Letsas, ‘Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation’, (2006) 4 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 705, 
706. 
31 Spielmann (n 18) 4. 
32 ABC (n 3), para 233. 
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however that, with respect to well-known principles of the Court’s jurisprudence, the margin 
of appreciation is narrower in cases where either an important facet of an individual’s identity 
is at stake, or a consensus among the Council of Europe Member States exists.33 The first of 
these contracting mechanisms reflects the fact that, where state policy impacts on an 
individual’s identity, the state may be infringing a person’s most intimate, inalienable rights. 
This paper will first analyse the Court’s decision to overlook the relevance of European 
consensus on providing abortion access to women whose health and wellbeing is at risk. It 
will then go on to examine the Court’s failure to address the impact of abortion restrictions on 
an individual’s identity, in section D. 
 The existence of “consensus”, as used by the Court, refers to the identification of a 
minimum standard or discernible trend among Council of Europe members on a matter 
“touching upon a human right.”34 Specifically, the Court looks to the law and practice of 
European states for a common trend, where a matter or interest is not enumerated in the 
Convention, or is perceived as being beyond the contemplation of the drafters.35  Where 
consensus is established, the Court will generally find that the interest in question is within 
the scope of the Convention’s protection. It is generally used as a basis for the evolution of 
Convention norms and aids the Court in its goal of ensuring the harmonious enforcement of 
human rights protection throughout Europe. 36  Accordingly, the existence of a European 
consensus decisively narrows a state’s margin of appreciation in deciding whether or not to 
protect a certain freedom. In other words, where a respondent state is shown to be out of step 
with European consensus, the Court will normally find a breach in rights protection. 
 In ABC, the Court went to surprising lengths to avoid such an outcome. The Court 
confirmed that there was a consensus amongst the majority of European states towards more 
liberal abortion policies than those that existed in Ireland.37 For example, it was conceded that 
the vast majority of the 47 Council of Europe Member States recognise a woman’s right to 
choose to terminate her pregnancy. Specifically, 35 countries permit abortion without 
restriction as to reason. Five countries limit the availability of abortion to circumstances 
                                                 
33 ibid, para 232. 
34 ABC (n 3), Joint partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Fura, Hirvelä, Malinverni, and 
Poalelungi, para 2. 
35 See generally, Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, ‘Does Consensus Matter? Legitimacy of European Consensus in the 
Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) PL 534. 
36 Spielmann (n 18) 15. See also ABC Dissent (n 34) paras 5-6. 
37 ABC (n 3), para 235. 
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where it is necessary for the protection of maternal health and wellbeing.38 A more restrictive 
regime than Ireland’s exists in just three states, in that it does not explicitly permit abortion 
on any grounds, even where the woman’s life is at risk.39 Thus, the first applicant was entitled 
to a lawful abortion in 40 of the 47 states, and the second applicant could have obtained an 
abortion legally in 35 states. This demonstrated that in balancing the health and wellbeing of 
the mother with the rights of the foetus, the European majority view definitively gave 
precedence to the former. In short, a European standard exists to afford more value to the 
health and wellbeing of the mother over the interests of the foetus. 
 However, the Court held that this consensus towards liberalising abortion laws to 
encompass protection for a woman’s health and wellbeing, did not narrow Ireland’s margin 
of appreciation.40 Instead, the Court held that the task of weighing the mother’s rights with 
the rights of the foetus could not be separated from the question of when life begins – a 
question on which there was no consensus in Europe, and on which states enjoyed a wide 
margin (as ruled in Vo v France).41 Accordingly, the Court decided that the margin afforded 
in respect of the protection of unborn life “necessarily translate[d]” into the margin that states 
have in balancing the rights of the mother and the unborn.42 
 
2. A Margin and Consensus that “do not toe the line”43 
There are two main problems with this assessment. Firstly, as the dissenting judges pointed 
out, the majority was wrong to conflate the issues of protection for maternal health and the 
protection for unborn life.44 The margin that was afforded in Vo concerned the question of 
whether or not to protect unborn life. That is, the Court held that a margin of appreciation 
should be allowed to each state to determine whether a foetus has a right to life. Ireland thus 
had a margin in its determination that the protection of pre-natal life was a vital interest of the 
country. Yet, Ireland was not deprived of its initial choice to protect the unborn by being  
required to balance this interest with the competing interests of the rights of the mother.45 
Judge Finlay Geoghegan also recognised that the transfer of the margin on the protection of 
                                                 
38  Poland, Spain, Portugal, Cyprus, Finland. Centre for Reproductive Rights, The World’s Abortion Laws 2011, 
(2011), <http://worldabortionlaws.com/index.html> accessed 8 August 2014. 
39 These states are Andorra, Maltam and San Marino. 
40 ABC (n 3), para 236. 
41 Vo v France, App no 53924/00 (ECtHR 8 July 2004 as highlighted in ABC (n 3), para 237. 
42 ibid. 
43 Paolo Ronchi, ‘A, B and C v Ireland: Europe’s Roe v Wade Still Has to Wait’ (2011) Oxford Student Legal 
Research Paper Series Paper number 14/2011, 4. 
44 ABC Dissent (n 34), para 2. 
45 See also: Sanjivi Krishnan, ‘What's the Consensus? The Grand Chamber's Decision on Abortion in A, B and 
C v Ireland’ (2011) 16(1) UHRLR. 2, 4. 
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unborn life to the margin that states have in balancing the rights of the mother and the unborn 
was erroneous. The judge noted that, for “the consensus to be relevant, it should be a 
consensus on the balance to be struck between the potentially competing interests of the 
rights of woman and the unborn.”46 It follows that the Court’s reasoning was somewhat 
circular, in that the majority believed that Ireland’s margin of appreciation could not be 
narrowed by consensus, because of the fact that Ireland already had a margin. As I have 
highlighted earlier though, the margin of appreciation afforded concerned a different issue. 
 It is interesting to note that, in Ireland v UK,47 the Court could arguably be said to 
have conflated the margin of appreciation on the question of whether a threat to the life of the 
nation existed, with the margin on the question of whether the measures used to address this 
threat were “strictly required by the exigencies” of the situation.48 However, in recent times 
the Court has cast off its reticence in scrutinising the proportionality of derogation measures, 
as evidenced by the Court’s decision in A & Ors.49 In other words, the margin that is afforded 
to states in deciding that there is a need to protect the life of their nation no longer translates 
into a margin on whether the resulting derogations are proportionate. In this vein, the margin 
afforded to Ireland in protecting pre-natal life should not have been reassigned to the question 
of whether a fair balance had been struck between the rights of the mother and those of the 
unborn. 
 The second problem is the motivation behind the first. That is, the Court’s 
justification for affording Ireland a wide margin to the state was premised on the “profound 
moral views” of the Irish people.50  As De Londras and Dzehtsiarou describe, the Court ruled 
that the “internal moral consensus” in Ireland “trumped” European consensus.51 Thus, the 
Court justified Ireland’s failure to protect the applicants’ rights in accordance with European 
standards, based on the fact that the dominant ideology in Ireland did not agree with the value 
                                                 
46 ABC (n 3), Concurring Opinion of Judge Finlay Geoghegan, para 8.  
47 Ireland v UK, App no 5310/71 (18 January 1978). 
48 See Oren Gross & Fionnoula Ní hAoláin, ‘From Discretion to Scrutiny: Revisiting the Application of the 
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15 of the European Court on Human Rights’ (2001) 
23(III) Human Rights Quarterly B. 
49 A & Ors v UK, App no 3455/05 (19 February 2009); see also Dudgeon v UK, App no 7525/76 (22 October 
1981), para 52 “It is for the national authorities to make the initial assessment of the pressing social need; 
accordingly, a margin of appreciation is left to them. However, their decision remains subject to review by the 
Court.” 
50 ABC (n 3), para 241. 
51 Fiona De Londras & Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, ‘Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, A, 
B and C v Ireland, Decision of 17 December 2010’ (2013) 62 ICLQ 2. 
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of these rights. 52  This reasoning represents “a real and dangerous new departure in the 
Court’s case-law.”53 It departs not only from precedent, but also from the harmonising role of 
the Court. 54   Strictly speaking, by enabling one country to deviate from the European 
standard of rights protection on the basis of relative values, the Court compromises its role in 
maintaining “minimum standards for rights protection.” 55  Yet before we consider the 
consequences of this deviation, it is worth underlining the novelty in this approach. 
 The dissenting opinion in ABC emphasised that this case marks the first time that 
European consensus was discounted on the basis of moral beliefs.56 For example, in Lautsi & 
Ors v Italy,57 which is further discussed elsewhere in this Journal,58 the presence of religious 
symbols (crucifixes) in state-run primary schools was challenged as infringing both the 
requirement of secularism, and the rights of pupils and their parents to entertain different 
religious beliefs.59 The Italian Government sought to rely on Italy’s “internal consensus”, 
claiming that the presence of crucifixes in schools was a “national particularity” rooted in the 
nation’s Catholic values. However, the Court was clear that its deference to Italy was not 
based on Italy’s internal consensus, but rather on the absence of European consensus on the 
issue, i.e. the lack of European standards on the presence of religious symbols in State 
schools.60  As Arai-Takahashi emphasises, ABC stands alone as a case in which cultural 
justifications were considered “sufficiently potent to dilute the solidly established 
methodology of European consensus.”61 
 This begs the question: why was the majority in ABC willing to depart so significantly 
from the Court’s own authority? Why, when the Court’s own principles should have guided it 
towards upholding a minimum standard of protection for reproductive freedom, did it choose 
not to? It appears that the Court is “too ready to abandon the notion of consensus where the 
                                                 
52 It worth noting that the actual existence of an internal consensus on abortion in Ireland is questionable, and is 
rigorously contested by many commentators (see, to that effect, De Londras and Dzehtsiarou (n 51), 7). 
However, it must be conceded that the process of fact finding ‘is not normally within the province of the 
European Court’ (Klaas v Germany, App no 15473/89 (6 September 1978), para 29). In other words, it is not 
clear what resources the Court has at its disposal that would allow it to definitively discern the lack of a moral 
consensus in Ireland. 
53 ABC Dissent (n 34), para 2. 
54 De Londras and Dzehtsiarou (n 51) 5; Ronchi (n 43) 6-7. 
55 De Londras and Dzehtsiarou (n 51), 1. 
56 ABC Dissent (n 34), paras 4-5.  
57 Lautsi & Ors v Italy, Application no. 30814/06 (ECtHR 18 March 2011). 
58 See Eugenio Velasco Ibarra’s contribution to this issue. 
59 ibid, paras 68-70. 
60 ibid, para 68. Additionally, the internal consensus argument was dismissed in Tyrer v UK, App No 5856/72 
[(25 April 1978) and Dudgeon v UK (n 49). 
61 Yuraka Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the 
Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Intersentia 2001) 27. 
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issue is too political to be decided by Strasbourg.”62 The disproportionate application of the 
margin speaks to a judicial desire to avoid a confrontation on an issue that is controversial 
and sensitive. The Court was determined to avoid contracting Ireland’s discretion on abortion 
policy. These functional concerns in the use of the margin in ABC are compounded by the 
resulting issues raised in respect of gender equality. 
 
D. DEFERENCE AND EQUALITY 
Abortion restrictions perpetuate a standard of state protection for human rights that is unequal 
and gendered. Blanket deference, where the Court gives the ultimate power of assessment to 
the national authorities, can thereby “open a door of approval” 63  for states which adopt 
discriminatory abortion laws. Gender equality has been long marked out as one of the 
fundamental principles of human rights law.64  The European Court of Human Rights itself 
has long asserted that the “advancement of the equality of the sexes” is an important goal of 
the Member States of the Council of Europe.65 Furthermore, the Court has reiterated that 
gender equality is one of the “key principles underlying the Convention.”66 Yet there is a 
stark divergence between such aspirations and the deference shown in ABC. In this section, 
the key link between abortion policies and gender equality will be established. This will 
underpin my critique of the Court’s application of the margin of appreciation in ABC, and 
illustrate how the Court’s judgment risks reproducing inequality. 
 The legal regulation of abortion prescribes the extent to which a pregnant woman’s 
rights can be abridged. The pregnant woman’s right to bodily integrity is invariably qualified, 
as both the state and medical practitioners assume significant control (at times even full 
control) over her pregnancy. As Rosemey Nisoff outlines, once a woman is pregnant, her 
rights are shared with the foetus she is supporting, with the state, and with her medical 
practitioners.67 Her autonomy is thus reduced, especially where the regulatory framework 
qualifies abortion, as doctors and legislators become the primary decision makers of whether 
she can terminate her pregnancy, and in turn deprive her of the opportunity to pursue any 
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other personally, rather than collectively, valued choices. The Irish example further illustrates 
that a woman’s attempts to access her reproductive rights may be criminalised. 
 This inequality in the treatment of pregnant women is compounded by the fact that 
unintended pregnancy disproportionately affects low-income women and minorities68  – those 
who already often find themselves victims of social and economic inequities. Abortion is 
often sought by women in circumstances of poverty, coercion and violence. 69  This is 
evidenced by the circumstances of the applicants in ABC and further highlighted, as the 
report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
shows, by the particular oppression caused by Ireland’s abortion laws to asylum seekers and 
women with limited financial resources.70 In addition, discrimination is perpetuated on socio-
economic grounds when abortion laws force women to travel long distances to access 
reproductive health services.71 
 Crucially, the policies that qualify a woman’s rights once she is pregnant represent a 
standard of state protection that rests solely on sex-specific grounds. That is, the rights of 
pregnant women and girls are selectively devalued on the basis of their reproductive 
capacities. Adult men possessing full legal capacity are not subjected to criminal sanctions 
for medical procedures that may be necessary for the preservation of any aspect of their 
health and the state does not refute their autonomy over their health decisions. The healthcare 
rights of pregnant women and girls are thus afforded a level of protection that is depreciated 
and gendered. Restrictive abortion polices thereby represent an evident barrier to women’s 
ability to obtain the same level of protection that is afforded to men. 
 In ABC, the Court did not conceal the fact that the respondent state suppresses 
women’s rights through abortion regulation. The balancing exercise that is deployed between 
a woman’s rights and the rights of the foetus overtly recognises that states operate legal 
policies which curtail a woman’s rights. Indeed, Convention protection of human rights is not 
unlimited, and the balancing of competing rights and freedoms is central to the Court’s 
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function.72 Yet the Court’s approach to abortion policies fails to address the discriminatory 
nature of this abridgment of women’s rights and there is no mention at all of the inequality 
created by restrictive abortion laws in the judgment. Rather, the Court responds to the 
violation of the rights of applicants A and B with a sweeping deference to the status quo. In 
this way, the Court’s application of the margin of appreciation in ABC serves to reinforce the 
structural, and gendered, inequality of abortion restrictions in Ireland. Three examples of the 
Court’s approach in ABC attest to this and serve to significantly undermine the Court’s 
endorsement of the principle of gender equality. 
 Firstly, the Court’s policy of deference results in the Court reproducing an unequal 
standard of rights protection. The Court fails to appreciate the significance of reproductive 
freedom to women’s identity and autonomy and therefore devalues the applicants’ Article 8 
rights. Secondly, the Court overlooks the gendered nature of the unequal protection of 
women’s rights by treating abortion as an isolated issue of domestic morality. Thirdly, in 
determining whether the restrictions imposed on women’s rights are “necessary in a 
democratic society”, the Court endorses a discriminatory state policy that requires women to 
travel abroad to access their rights. In short, the Court fails to scrutinise the gendered nature 
of the abortion restrictions and thus sanctions a gendered hierarchy of rights protection.  
 
1. The Unequal Protection of Rights 
a) The devaluation of the applicants’ Article 8 rights  
The majority in ABC echoed the Court’s previous jurisprudence, such that the regulation of 
pregnancy came within the sphere of “private life” as protected by Article 8 of the European 
Convention. The Court proceeded to outline that Article 8’s protection included !the right to 
personal autonomy and personal development” (which are viewed as aspects of an 
individual's “physical and social identity” 73 ) as well as the right to “physical and 
psychological integrity”.74 As Ronchi highlights, this rhetoric bears a striking resemblance to 
the reasoning of Blackmun J in the seminal US abortion case, Roe v Wade.75 However, while 
Roe guaranteed abortion rights to women in the US, ABC declared that “Article 8 could not 
be interpreted as conferring a right to an abortion.”76 Though the judiciary at both sides of the 
Atlantic agreed that abortion restrictions impacted upon women’s rights, the conclusions 
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reached in the respective courts diverged significantly. The European Court’s use of the 
margin of appreciation facilitated this finding.  
 As mentioned above, the majority in ABC stated that where a “particularly important 
facet of an individual existence or identity is at stake”77 the margin of appreciation afforded 
to a state will be narrowed, yet the Court in ABC was not inclined to restrict national 
discretion on abortion. Thus, in order to ensure that Ireland’s latitude of deference on the 
abortion question is not curtailed, the Grand Chamber curtails the breadth of the applicants’ 
Article 8 rights and in particular the protection of their “physical and social identity”. The 
Court does this in two ways. 
 First, the Court attempts to divert attention away from the fact that abortion 
restrictions are a matter of human rights. By merging the margin of appreciation that Ireland 
had on the question of when life begins with the margin of appreciation on abortion, the 
Court shifts the attention away from the impairment caused to the applicants’ Article 8 
rights.78 Instead, the meta-legal question of “when does life begin” becomes the pivot around 
which the Court’s assessment revolves. In this way, the Court avoids having to determine if 
the primacy afforded to the protection of foetal life over the rights of the mother breaches 
Convention standards, as there exists no Convention standard on the question of when life 
begins. The applicants’ claims to bodily integrity, autonomy and identity are thus subsumed 
by a discourse on the beginning of life79  and are afforded scant review in the majority 
opinion. 
 Secondly, in treating abortion as, primarily, an issue of domestic morality, the critical 
importance of reproductive control to a woman’s identity is overlooked. This is crucial as 
policies that encroach upon an individual’s identity demand strict scrutiny under the 
Convention. Beyond the biological event that substantially defines one’s physical identity, 
pregnancy holds implications for every aspect of a woman’s social identity – her 
relationships, her self-understanding, her education, her career, her economic status, and, 
more broadly, her ability to live the life she chooses.80 It should be recognised also that the 
impact on identity is not abstract or individualistic. The decision to have an abortion is a 
“concrete decision about intimate relations and family composition” 81  and the pregnant 
woman’s relational identity is deeply implicated in the reproductive decision. However, the 
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Court in ABC does not discuss the consequences for the women on whom unwanted 
pregnancy is imposed. Instead, the Court defers to the state priority of the protection of 
domestic values. As Alison Jaggar underlines, it is both counterfactual and biased to treat 
abortion as a “self contained issue of morality”82. Rather, abortion must be examined from 
the point of view of women’s real life experiences and the impact of pregnancy on their 
identity. Yet the Court in ABC fails to acknowledge the significance of reproductive freedom 
to women’s identity and thus prevents the recognition of the applicants’ Article 8 rights. 
 Though the Court fails to adequately engage with Article 8 rights in ABC, it can be 
observed that it has previously found in favour of applicants who have sought to protect their 
abortion rights under the right to private life. Crucially however, these have been existing 
rights and the Court has never expanded beyond the level of reproductive freedom afforded 
by national authorities. As mentioned above, the Court found in favour of the third applicant 
in ABC,83 but was adamant that applicant C did not seek a right to an abortion beyond what 
had already been provided for under domestic law84 (albeit that this right was unclear and 
ambiguous). In Tysiac v Poland, a Polish woman sought an abortion as her pregnancy 
threatened to eradicate her sight but she was refused despite the fact that Polish law allows 
for terminations where pregnancy endangers maternal health. The Court found a breach of the 
Convention Article 8 on the basis that Poland had failed to safeguard the applicant’s ability to 
determine her qualification for a therapeutic abortion. Yet the Court purposely distanced 
itself from the substantive claim of a violation of the applicant’s reproductive freedom. As 
Nicollette Prialxu argues, the Court did not make clear that the deprivation of a lawful 
abortion was unjust.85 The Court will uphold Article 8 claims only when they encroach on 
procedural aspects of the right rather than on the crux of self-determination or autonomy in 
reproductive decisions.86 Moreover, in Tysiac, the Court relied on the fact that, on paper, 
Poland provided for abortion in limited circumstances to conclude that there was no need to 
examine the broader significance of the case or if any alleged “right to have an abortion” had 
been infringed.87  
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 Furthermore, in a set of particularly disturbing facts in P and S v Poland,88 the state 
was found to have violated the right to private life of a 14-year-old victim of rape, owing to 
the exceptional difficulties she encountered in accessing an abortion, which she was entitled 
to under Polish law. Yet it must be emphasised that, while the Court upheld the applicant’s 
Article 8 rights, it did not liberalise Poland’s abortion laws. In fact, the Court reiterated a 
deferential approach such that the “examination of national legal solutions was of particular 
importance for [its] assessment” of the applicant’s complaint and then confined this 
assessment to the positive obligations that the state was already under.89 
 
b) The failure to engage Article 3 
All three applicants in ABC challenged Ireland’s restrictive abortion regime under Article 3, 
namely on the ground that the impact of the restrictions on abortion and of travelling for an 
abortion abroad amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment.90  The Court regarded this 
complaint as “manifestly ill-founded”91 and quickly dispatched the evidence before it. While 
the majority did recognise that women endure “significant psychological burdens” in being 
required to leave their home country to seek medical treatment prohibited there, they ruled 
that this did not reach the threshold of Article 3.92 
 This dismissal was an unsound outcome. It can be argued that the Court’s refusal to 
recognise the Article 3 violations in the context of abortion is motivated by the absolute 
nature of the right in question and the limited opportunity of invoking the margin of 
appreciation in this regard. The Court has defined “degrading treatment” as that which is said 
to “arouse in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority, capable of humiliating and 
debasing them.”93 In the case of ABC, substantial evidence was provided to demonstrate that 
the severity of Irish law and the resulting and pervasive stigma of abortion were an affront to 
women’s dignity.94 Irish women who seek abortions are given three choices by the state: 
(i) they must overcome the trauma, taboo and financial difficulties of travelling 
abroad to do something which is illegal in their own country; 
(ii) they must seek unsafe back-street abortions for which they may be imprisoned; or 
                                                 
88  P and S v Poland App no 57375/08 (ECtHR 30 October 2012). 
89 ibid paras 97-98. 
90 ABC (n 3), para 160. 
91 ABC (n 3), para 165. 
92 ABC (n 3), paras 239-241. 
93 Ireland v UK (n 47), para 167. 
94 ABC (n 3), submission from Doctors for Choice, paras 120-131. 
The Margin of Appreciation in A, B and C v Ireland: A Disproportionate Response to the 
Violation of Women’s Reproductive Freedom 
 
254 
(iii) they must maintain their pregnancies – even where this places their health and 
wellbeing at risk.  
Debasing feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority are consistent outcomes for each course of 
action.  
 Restrictive abortion laws further impact on dignity, as they perpetuate a pervasive 
stigma. This in turn threatens respect for the equal worth of all individuals.95 The principal 
mechanism by which stigmatisation violates dignity is the corrosion of individual self-respect 
and self-worth.96 It also includes a loss in social hierarchy and is multidimensional, so that it 
has socio-political effects. The stigma created by restrictive abortion laws induces a 
“chilling” climate of fear and shame that impacts on both those who seek abortion services 
and those who carry out the procedure.97 Women may be penalised for seeking access to 
necessary healthcare, which can cause deep humiliation, fear and even violence. Thus, the 
need to seek illegal health services and the intense stigmatisation of both the abortion 
procedure and the women who seek such procedures can have deleterious effects on women’s 
mental health. In addition, as the United Nations Special Rapporteur concluded in 2011, 
restrictive abortion laws produce a chilling effect, which may prevent healthcare workers 
from seeking training and information on abortion.98  Healthcare workers who choose to 
perform abortions under these circumstances may accordingly be uninformed and untrained 
on appropriate abortion procedure and post-abortion care, reducing the quality and 
availability of legal abortions. Furthermore, the criminalisation of abortion creates a vicious 
cycle; as the United Nations Special Rapporteur investigated “...the stigma resulting from 
procuring an illegal abortion perpetuates the notion that abortion is an immoral practice, 
which then reinforces the continued criminalization of the practice.” 99 
 Even for women who can afford to travel and who can navigate the logistics of 
obtaining an abortion abroad, the emotional burdens involved are profound.100 In ABC, all 
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applicants described the stigma and fear they felt in going abroad to do something that was a 
criminal offence in their own country. This was compounded upon return in seeking post-
abortion care. 
 Additionally, the Court’s jurisprudence has demonstrated that Article 3 may be 
breached by reason of the failure to provide appropriate medical treatment (see Ilhan v 
Turkey).101 As Judge Lopez Guerra points out in his concurring judgment, the majority in 
ABC does not make reference to the degree of gravity of the real or perceived dangers to the 
applicants’ health or wellbeing in their individual cases.102 There may well be cases where 
the risk to the health of a pregnant woman, as opposed to her life, is such that travelling 
overseas may not be an option. While the health dangers of the applicants in ABC were not 
such as to impede travel outright, significant evidence was submitted to the Court of the ill-
treatment that may be suffered due to Irish law. For example, Doctors for Choice highlighted 
how women in Ireland face inevitable delays in abortions abroad, de facto exclusion from 
early non-invasive medical abortion, and are regularly left to seek ‘backstreet’ and illegal 
abortions.103 Vital post-abortion medical care and counselling in Ireland are only arbitrarily 
available, as Irish doctors receive no training in post-abortion care. Furthermore, the Doctors 
for Choice group outlined how the stigma and fear imposed by the Irish abortion regime 
discourages women from seeking care. 104 
 International human rights standards would support this assessment, i.e. that a failure 
to provide necessary healthcare in the context of abortion may reach the level of ill-treatment 
under Article 3. In KL v Peru,105 a young woman sought an abortion where she had been told 
that the foetus she was carrying had developed a severe abnormality that was likely to be 
fatal. She was refused an abortion under Peruvian law and she subsequently gave birth to a 
visibly deformed child who died after 4 days. The experience caused her to suffer severe 
depression. The UN Human Rights Committee ruled that in refusing an abortion and causing 
her foreseeable severe mental suffering, Peru had violated Article 7 of the ICCPR 
(prohibition on inhuman and degrading treatment.) Sanjivi Krishnan argues that this implies 
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that Article 7 itself includes state responsibility to provide access to abortion where a 
woman’s health is put at risk.106 
 In ABC, substantial evidence was espoused to demonstrate that Ireland has failed in its 
positive obligations to protect women from degrading treatment. Yet crucially, from the 
Court’s point of view, a determination that Article 3 applied would be legally and 
symbolically a “nuclear option”. In other words, if an Article 3 violation had been 
recognised, the Court would not have been able to use the margin of appreciation and no 
room would exist for national deference.107  
 It is significant that the reluctance to engage Article 3 is also evident in the case of 
Tysiac v Poland. As noted earlier, in Tysiac the applicant was forced to continue with a 
pregnancy knowing she would be blind by the end of it. Yet this could not be understood as 
creating “feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing” for a 
young woman who already had 4 young children to care for.108 Though in P and S v Poland, 
the Court found a violation of Article 3, this was not due to the state’s regulation on abortion, 
but to issues surrounding how the authorities had treated the applicant and her family.109 RR v 
Poland110 is the only other reproductive freedom case where the Court found a violation of 
Article 3. There, a woman was deliberately refused genetic tests during her pregnancy by pro-
life doctors until the time limit for an abortion had passed. The Court agreed that the woman 
had suffered degrading treatment, having been forced to endure “weeks of painful uncertainty 
concerning the health of the foetus, her own and her family’s future and the prospect of 
raising a child suffering from an incurable ailment.”111 While this insightful reasoning is to be 
welcomed, it is relevant that genetic testing was not prohibited in Poland and that the doctors 
were acting on their own beliefs. The ruling of the European Court thus did not require a 
liberalisation of Polish abortion law per se. Yet in ABC, a finding of degrading treatment 
would certainly have imposed significant obligations on the Irish state to expand access to 
abortion within its borders. The Court’s reticence to probe this acute sensitivity however 
proves unrelenting in ABC, where recourse to the margin of appreciation prevents the Court 
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from recognising the inhuman and degrading treatment experienced by women who are 
denied access to an abortion. 
 
2. The Dismissal of Gender 
By focusing purely on abortion as a matter of morality, the Court disregards the 
discriminatory impact of abortion. As Blanca Rodriguez-Ruiz demonstrates, the gender 
dimension of abortion restrictions is eclipsed by metalegal and metaphysical arguments.112 
As noted earlier, regardless of a person’s stance on abortion, it cannot be contested that 
abortion restrictions result in a different level of state protection for women; a differentiation 
that is justified on the basis of a biological trait. Yet what this means for women’s rights or 
access to equality is subsumed in arguments based on biology, morality and politics.113 The 
misplaced emphasis on the question of when life begins enables the Court to overlook the 
discriminatory nature of Ireland’s abortion policies. As Shapiro outlines, the legitimacy of 
abortion policy should not be determined by considerations as imponderable as the beginning 
of life, but by whether a domestic policy places a disproportionate burden on an active 
citizen’s rights.114 In ABC however, the Court fails to adequately scrutinise the impact of 
Ireland’s abortion policy on women’s lives. Nonetheless, it is not sufficient for a human 
rights court to accept the inequities women endure as an unfortunate incident of domestic 
regulation. The Court’s goal of gender equality becomes meaningless if it does not protect 
against a gendered system of rights protection within contracting states. However, in ABC the 
Court not only ignored the impact of abortion policies on women’s rights, but it went as far as 
to endorse a policy of sending women abroad to access their human rights. 
 
3. Overt Endorsement of Discrimination – Sending Women Abroad to Access Human 
Rights 
Though the Court was adamant that the Irish Government was to benefit from a wide power 
of appreciation, it was necessary to examine whether the interference with the applicants’ 
rights was “necessary in a democratic society”. This involved an assessment of whether 
denying women access to abortion – even where maternal health and wellbeing are under 
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threat – is proportionate to the aim of protecting Irish morals.115 As I have explained above, 
the Court conflated the margin that was to be applied to this balancing act with that which 
Ireland possessed in determining whether to protect unborn life. This misplaced margin of 
appreciation resulted in the Court condoning the Irish solution of sending women abroad to 
access their human rights. 
 The Court reasoned that the prohibition on abortion for health and wellbeing reasons 
did not exceed the margin of appreciation, on the basis that the Thirteenth Amendment to the 
Irish Constitution removes any legal impediment to adult women travelling abroad for an 
abortion. 116  The “option” 117  of travelling to another state to access their reproductive 
autonomy was judged to satisfy Convention requirements. This article contends that the 
inclusion of the availability of travel as part of the calculation of proportionality is 
unjustifiable for two reasons. Firstly, it absolves Ireland from its binding responsibility under 
the Convention to protect the rights and freedoms of all persons within its jurisdiction.118 
Secondly, requiring women to go abroad to have their rights respected results in severe 
inequalities. 
 It is contrary to the Convention’s most explicit aim, that of “securing the universal 
and effective recognition and observance of rights”,119 to absolve a state of their human rights 
responsibilities on the basis that that state does not stop people from travelling to other 
countries, where their rights will be ultimately recognised. As noted by the Centre for 
Reproductive Rights, it is a well-known principle of international human rights law that a 
state’s fulfilment of its human rights obligations is judged on the basis of that state’s 
performance alone.120 Yet in ABC, the Court elevates this long-standing British ‘solution’ to 
an Irish problem to the satisfaction of human rights.  
 It is imperative that the Court avoid endorsing such policies. There exists no 
impediment in Ireland to men obtaining any medical intervention to protect their health and 
quality of life. Yet if a woman requires an abortion in order to protect her health and 
wellbeing, she will not be secured this protection in her state. Instead, the state’s response is 
that she must risk her health further, and get on a boat or a plane to access the medical care 
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she needs. The judgment suggests that it is within a state’s margin of appreciation to treat its 
citizens unequally on a moral basis. This is compounded by the fact that travelling overseas 
may not be an option for many, a consideration wholly absent from the Court’s opinion. For 
unemployed women or women earning low wages, the freedom to travel is illusory. In 2013, 
Human Rights Watch identified the cost of an early medical abortion in the UK at £535 
(€670) and £800 (€1000) for an abortion preformed in late gestation.121 These sums are not 
inclusive of other costs that are likely to be incurred, such as travel and accommodation, 
childcare, loss of income and the costs of a travelling companion. Human Rights Watch 
outline that the total cost of an abortion could exceed an individual’s monthly salary.122 For 
many women, this barrier will be insurmountable.123  
 Additionally, for refugee women in Ireland, the constitutional freedom to travel does 
not exist. Lacking the time and money to obtain passports, they must apply to the Department 
of Justice for travel documents to leave the country. The Department has no policy to address 
these situations and therefore decides on an ad hoc basis. Secondly, the cost of obtaining an 
abortion abroad is likely to be out of reach, as asylum seekers do not have the right to work in 
Ireland. Instead they are in receipt of “direct provision” from the Irish Government, which 
amounts to €19.10 a week.124 An additional cost may be incurred, as it is necessary for all 
non-EU nationals in Ireland to apply and pay for visas to enter the UK, or Schengen visas to 
enter into a European Union (EU) country. The position of women under 18 is equally 
difficult. In 2007, a 17-year-old girl in the care of the state and carrying a foetus with a fatal 
abnormality was forced to initiate proceedings in the High Court in order to claim her right to 
travel for an abortion.125 In light of the tangible barriers to travel, it would seem inappropriate 
to suggest that an ‘option’ of travel can negate a breach of the Convention.  
 Sheelagh McGuinness highlights that the Grand Chamber has since followed the ABC 
approach of including the availability of cross-border treatment in its assessment of 
proportionality.126 In SH & Ors v Austria127 the Court opined that Austria provided adequate 
respect for the applicants’ right to privacy as the State did not prohibit people from travelling 
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abroad to avail of assisted procreation techniques that are proscribed in Austria. However, it 
was also relevant that, upon return, Austrian law would respect the wishes of the parents 
regarding paternity and maternity.128 This ‘tolerance’ – a principle that has been marked out 
as critical to the assessment of whether a restriction on a right is “necessary in a democratic 
society”129 – cannot be said to be present in ABC. As detailed, Irish women who travel abroad 
for abortions face an unrelenting stigma upon return. Additionally, the availability of post-
abortion care is limited. 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
Marie Dembour has remarked: “[w]hen it comes to illustrating the way in which human 
rights law at Strasburg fails to address women’s predicament in a male-dominant society, 
abortion is an excellent case in point.”130 A, B & C v Ireland is the case that validates her 
condemnation of the European Court of Human Rights. Demarcated as unequal citizens, the 
women in ABC turned to the judicial process to vindicate their rights and seek equal 
protection. Some argue that the Court is not there to perform miracles on behalf of reluctant 
legislatures.131 This claim may be particularly applicable to an international court which 
oversees a system of rights protection dependent on the subsidiary protection of contracting 
states. Crucially, however, in ABC the European Court represented an institution that was 
both legitimate and institutionally competent to address the violation of women’s 
reproductive freedom. In the first instance, it has been shown the Court had the competence 
to define the minimum standard of protection for women’s reproductive freedom owing to 
the presence of European consensus. Secondly, by the Court’s own admission, the principle 
of gender equality underpins both the European Convention and human rights. The Court was 
thus mandated to scrutinise the regulations that afford an unequal standard of protection to 
women’s rights and that place access to equality beyond the reach of many women. However, 
through its reliance on the margin of appreciation, the majority in ABC bypasses the 
violations and inequality before it. In doing so, the Court shrinks from its obligations as an 
international human rights adjudicator. That is, by departing from its established 
methodology and acquiescing to the position of the national authorities, the Court eludes its 
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role in determining the minimum standards of the Convention, and fails to safeguard against 
a gendered hierarchy of rights protection. 
 This article has shown that the application of the margin of appreciation in the 
majority decision of A, B & C v Ireland is disproportionate on two main grounds. Firstly, 
although there exists clear consensus throughout the Council of Europe regarding situations 
where the rights of the mother should outweigh those of the foetus (i.e. risk to health, 
wellbeing), the Court deemed this inapplicable. Instead, the Court endorses Irish 
exceptionalism on abortion as an “internal consensus” that can prevail upon European 
standards. Secondly, the Court’s reliance on the margin of appreciation to defer to the 
national authorities results in the Court backtracking on foundational principles of its human 
rights jurisprudence. This paper outlined that abortion cases demand a heightened standard of 
judicial scrutiny in order to accord equal value to women’s lives and their rights. By contrast, 
the European Court defers to the status quo, fails to address the feelings of debasement, as 
well as the discrimination caused by Ireland’s abortion regime and, thus, ultimately devalues 
women’s rights. While the Court attempts to portray the margin as a means of respecting 
domestic morals and cultural values, this disguise is thinly veiled. The margin of appreciation 
is applied as a tool of evasion, yet these judicial politics amount to a disproportionate 
response to the violation of women’s reproductive freedom in ABC. 
 
